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Discrimination, Distribution, and City
Regulation of Speech
By KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN*
City attorneys are often obligated to be on the front lines of conflict
between public regulation and freedom of speech. While trying to run a
city, keep traffic moving, maintain an aesthetic appearance, preserve public
safety and order, and prevent fraud or violence, you often run up against
people who want to speak, march, demonstrate, picket, leaflet, or sell or
solicit in the street. It has been my experience that cities are remarkably
conscientious about trying to give breathing room for speech. But First
Amendment law gives you two distinct sets of commands about regulating
speech in the public forum that, I will suggest, sometimes seem to conflict
with one another.
First, you may not discriminate, even in the allocation of public property, against speakers for their message, ideology, or subject matter. The
Supreme Court has long enforced this ban on content-based discrimination
in the public forum and has treated as implicit or presumptive content discrimination any scheme that gives standardless discretion to the mayor or
the police to pick and choose among speakers 2 or allows the hostility of the
audience to determine the amount of speech that is heard.3 And, second,
you must take care not to restrict too greatly the distribution of speech,
even if you do so through content-neutral laws.
This second, distributional constraint holds that a city is a type of
public trustee or guardian for First Amendment rights in the public square,

* Stanley Morrison Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. This essay is a lightly edited
version of remarks made at Hastings College of the Law, at the "Cities on the Cutting Edge"
symposium, on September 20, 1997.
1. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92,95 (1972).
2. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988) (invalidating mayor's standardless discretion over the placement of newsracks on public property).
3. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129, 137 (1992) (invalidating law calibrating parade user's fee to the expected hostility of the audience).
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not merely a private property owner who may exercise complete managerial discretion there. 4 Speakers have a prescriptive easement of access to
some kinds of public property, which serve as a place of last resort for
people without significant private resources to speak. Those who cannot
command the airwaves, the cable network or the Internet may still stand on
a soapbox on a street comer or hand out crudely-lettered leaflets to
passersby. Thus public spaces provide some ultimate distributional floor
ensuring that poorly financed causes may be heard. 5
In recent years, the Supreme Court has limited the force of this distributional constraint, reading the First Amendment to give cities considerable managerial leeway to impose content-neutral, time, place, and manner
regulations on public spaces. 6 Cautioning that judges should not replace
city managers and city officials as the administrators of public spaces, the
Court has required deference to cities unless they impose substantially
greater limitations on speech than are required by the demands of order or
aesthetics or protection of the citizenry from fraud, violence, and other
dangers.7 The Court has thus tried to signal that it is not going to strike
down every time, place, and manner regulation that might have been drawn
more narrowly, might have applied to a few less portions of the city, or
might have been less encompassing. Mere suggestions of less restrictive
alternatives will not be sufficient to invalidate such regulations. Rather,
courts will defer to cities here so long as they have a good empirical basis
for their regulations and they have not banned so much speech as to wipe
out entirely speakers' space of last resort.
The discrimination and distribution constraints, however, sometimes
seem to catch cities in a kind of pincer movement. Broad prohibitions of
conduct in certain areas of a city-such as a peddling ban in a downtown
shopping district or a flat ban on any activity other than ingress or egress
within a certain distance of an abortion clinic-may prevent speech altogether. So, cities that are conscientious about their distributional role in
providing speaking opportunities may try to create exceptions to such prohibitions for conduct closely connected to speech. But they will not want
to make such exceptions too broad, lest they immunize bad speakers who
4. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.").
5. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (noting that handbilling is
"essential to the poorly financed causes of little people").
6. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798-99; Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 299.
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cause the harms they want to prevent along with good speakers who do
not. Any exception that seeks to distinguish the good speakers from the
bad, however, runs up against the antidiscrimination constraint: particularized, speaker-based exceptions are likely to render the law impermissibly content-based. The ironic result is that First Amendment law seems to
prefer flat bans prohibiting more speech to selective bans prohibiting less
speech.
Two recent controversies illustrate the problem. First, recall recent
battles over the regulation of street vending of message-bearing merchandise, especially slogan-emblazoned T-shirts. How did the T-shirt wars begin? The seminal case was Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City & County
of San Francisco.8 In Gaudiya, the Ninth Circuit faced the novel question
whether the First Amendment might be violated by a permit scheme for
sales of expressive merchandise-merchandise with a message printed on
it, such as Greenpeace key rings, California PIRG coffee mugs, or "Save
the Whales" T-shirts. The Ninth Circuit held that sales of merchandise
that are inextricably intertwined with political, religious or ideological
messages do count as speech and thus regulation of such activity triggers
First Amendment review.9 Having reached such a novel holding, the court
went on to apply well-settled law to invalidate the San Francisco ordidiscretion to city
nance, holding that it granted impermissibly standardless
10
forum.
public
the
in
speak
to
permission
over
officials
In the aftermath of Gaudiya, a variety of non-profit groups expanded
T-shirt sales on the streets of various cities, especially in areas with a
flourishing tourist trade, such as Honolulu and Washington, D.C.-which I
will focus on-as well as Las Vegas, the port of San Diego, and Key
West." Unlike groups selling T-shirts as an incident to seeking signatures
on petitions or handing out flyers and leaflets about their cause-as the
Ninth Circuit appeared to envision the plaintiffs in Gaudiya-some of
these groups became mass merchandisers of T-shirts pure and simple, using the public forum as a tax-free, rent-free flea market or bazaar. At many
of the tables piled high with T-shirts on public sidewalks, the only message
being actively conveyed was "5 shirts for $20." And yet vendors relied
upon Gaudiya to assert that they had something like an absolute First
Amendment right to engage in such sales, so long as there was some message somewhere on their T-shirts.
8. 952 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,504 U.S. 914 (1992).
9. See id. at 1063-65.
10. See id. at 1065-66.
11. See One World One Family Now, Inc. v. Nevada, 860 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (D. Nev.
1994); One World One Family Now v. City of Key West, 852 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (S.D. Fla.
1994); ISKCON v. San Diego Unified Port DisL, No. 91-1768-B (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1992).
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The City of Honolulu experienced an especially strong wave of such
T-shirt vending in the mid-1990's. Kalakaua Avenue, the main thoroughfare in Waikiki Beach, was virtually taken over by row after row of long,
stationary tables, some complete with thatched fringe tops, at which Tshirts imprinted with colorful pictures of parrots and tropical fish alongside
messages such as "Take it Easy, Meditate, Hang Loose Hawaii" sold very
briskly. City officials, faced with mounting complaints that the tables were
an eyesore and an obstruction and that the T-shirt sales were undercutting
business by local merchants, tried very conscientiously to figure out what
they could do within the bounds of the First Amendment.2 I had the privilege of serving on the City's legal team in this endeavor.1
A wide variety of options was discussed, but, in the end, they boiled
down to two-apart from then-Mayor Frank Fasi's attempt to discourage
the T-shirt sales by airlifting some hundred 1,000-pound potted palms to
"beautify" the main spots on the avenue that had been occupied by T-shirt
vendors (the vendors simply moved or enjoyed the shade.). The first option was to apply to the T-shirt sales a long-standing ordinance flatly banning all peddling in the Waikiki special district, a uniquely populous and
historically significant area, favored by tourists, covering less than threequarters of a square mile within the City of Honolulu. 1 3 This approach had
the important virtue of content-neutrality; the peddling ordinance aimed at
protecting the historical and aesthetic ambiance and public order of the few
small areas such as Waikiki that it covered, and it applied to sales of beach
mats and suntan oil as much as to sales of message-bearing T-shirts. But
this approach would eliminate street sales of message-bearing T-shirts altogether within the special district of Waikiki.
The City's second option was to pass special legislation allowing
some T-shirt sales on public streets and sidewalks of Waikiki but regulating their time, place, or manner-for example, by designating a particular
vacant lot as a merchandising site or by allowing T-shirts to be sold by
hand rather than from tables. But lest the streets become a mass merchandising free-for-all, where "Just Do It" was as much a ticket to street sale as
"Hang Loose Hawaii," any such regulation would have to specify what
type of T-shirts could be sold-for example, those with genuine religious,
political, philosophical, or ideological content or those sold by non-profit
organizations. And any such specification would necessarily have the vice
of being content-based.

12. My distinguished colleagues in these efforts were Donna Woo, then Deputy City Attorney, and Professor Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii Law School.
13. See HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES § 29-6.2 (b) (7) (1954).
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The choice seemed clear: applying the peddling ordinance ran less
First Amendment risk than passing legislation specially exempting T-shirt
vendors from its strictures, subject to time, place, and manner regulations.
To require the City to scrutinize T-shirt messages for their intellectual
content, and thus to require police officers on the beat on crowded city
streets to ensure that the exempted merchandise was sufficiently "religious,
political, philosophical or ideological," seemed a First Amendment nightmare. Far from being less restrictive of speech than the flat peddling ordinance, such an approach appeared more restrictive, entangling government
in elusive content determinations. Nor was it an obvious answer to say all
"nonprofits" could simply sell what merchandise they wished, because the
Supreme Court has suggested that subject matter distinctions between
commercial and noncommercial speech are
suspect unless linked to their
4
demonstrably distinctive external effects.'
Thus, even if the flat ban posed any distributive problem, discriminatory exemptions seemed plainly a cure worse than the disease. 15 The City
accordingly, on the advice of the legal team assembled by the City Attorney's office, began enforcing the peddling ordinance, thereby engendering
a First Amendment challenge by the two largest T-shirt vendors. 6 After a
split district court ruling enjoining enforcement of the peddling ordinance
on the side streets but not the main avenues of Waikiki, the Ninth Circuit
wholly vindicated the City in One World One Family Now v. City and
County of Honolulu,17 which upheld the peddling ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner ordinance as applied to expressive T-shirt
sales throughout Waikiki.
Other jurisdictions that have taken an approach similar to Honolulu's
have been similarly successful in defending against First Amendment
challenges. For example, a National Park Service regulation banning peddling on the national Mall and other national parks in D.C. was upheld as
applied to sales of religious beads and audio tapes1 8 and to sales of mes-

14. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1517 (1993) (holding that a city may not ban commercial newsracks while allowing noncommercial newsracks that
pose identical aesthetic and obstruction harms).
15. Cf. Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S..at 297 (noting that exempting expressive camping from a flat ban on camping on certain national parklands "would
present difficult problems for the Park Service").
16. The city council did pass a special time, place and manner regulation of-expressive merchandise sales as an interim measure pending the outcome of the lawsuit against enforcement of
the antipeddling measure, but it was invalidated at an early stage of the litigation, and the City did
not pursue this route further.
17. 76 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 554 (1996).
18. See ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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sage-bearing T-shirts,1 9 even though it contained an exception for books,
newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, and buttons. 20

But jurisdictions that have taken the alternative approach--of trying
to allow but regulate certain sales of expressive merchandise-have sometimes gotten into First Amendment trouble by trying to be more permissive
toward speech. For example, when Los Angeles barred peddling of anything on the open thoroughfares of the Venice Boardwalk except by nonprofit organizations selling merchandise bearing an ideological, political,
religious, or philosophical message-an exception perhaps attempting to
comply with Gaudiya-theNinth Circuit invalidated the law on its face,2 '

holding that a city may not privilege non-profit organizations over other
persons trying to advance a message by selling merchandise.
For a second illustration of how cities may be caught in a vicegrip
between admonitions to increase the distribution of speech in public space,
and at the same time, to avoid content discrimination, consider recent con-

troversies over the regulation of demonstrations outside abortion clinics.
How should a city regulate loud, potentially obstructive, potentially harassing demonstrators outside an abortion clinic who conscientiously believe that abortion is murder and that they are engaged in a very important
form of civil rights protest? Some cities have left to private abortion pro-

viders the route of seeking injunctions under general nuisance laws that
22

have the effect of creating a buffer zone or bubble around the clinic.
Some cities have sought similar effects through legislation. 23
There are two possible types of abortion clinic bubbles. One draws a
fixed perimeter, or cordon sanitaire,delimiting an area outside an abortion

clinic from which all demonstrations are kept at bay. The Supreme Court
19. See Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial v. Kennedy, 116 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir.
1997), cert.denied, 118 S.Ct. 1035 (1998).
20. See id. The D.C. Circuit found this exception for certain media, as opposed to certain
viewpoints or subject matters, content-neutral rather than content-based and rejected the claim
that it undermined the Park Service's claimed objectives. See i at 496. The Ninth Circuit likewise found permissibly content-neutral the Honolulu peddling ordinance's exceptions for newspapers, concessions, parade buttons, and souvenirs. See One World, 76 F.3d at 1012-13 n.5 (reasoning that exceptions to otherwise content-neutral ordinances are acceptable so long as they do
not enable the city to discriminate on the basis of ideas).
21. See Perry v. L.A. Police Dep't, 121 F.3d 1365 (9th Cir. 1997). The court found that the
ordinance, even if content-neutral, was insufficiently narrowly tailored because it swept in too
much protected speech by persons not affiliated with non-profit corporations. See id. But underlying this outcome was plainly the court's concern that "speaker-based discrimination is unacceptable." I,
22. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 117 S.Ct. 855 (1997);
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 120 F.3d 161, 161 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (reprinting
Phoenix ordinance limiting demonstration activity within one hundred feet of a health care facility).
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has upheld such flat area bans, so long as they are not too broad.2 The
second kind of bubble, however, is more problematic. Suppose a judge or
city council provides that a person entering or exiting an abortion clinic
inay say to a demonstrator who approaches her, "Stay away; don't talk to
me; stand at least eight or ten or fifteen feet away," and have that request
enforced. Such a protection in effect creates a floating buffer zone that
moves with the person. The Supreme Court, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network,25 recently struck down such a provision of an injunction, holding
that it violated the First Amendment to afford entrants to a clinic the right
to banish speakers who would address them to a distance 15 feet away.2
The Court reasoned that a floating buffer zone is content-neutral but
is not narrowly tailored to public safety or clinic access because it cuts off
too much speech. 27 One person walking along a sidewalk near a clinic
could effectively create a demonstration-free zone much larger than the
one created by a 15- or 36-foot fixed bright line-especially because a
shifting line, like a vague statute, creates uncertainty as to where, if anywhere, the anti-abortion speaker may speak at all. In Sabelko v. City of
Phoenix,28 the Ninth Circuit extended the logic of Schenck from floatingbubble injunctions to floating-bubble ordinances, even though the Supreme
Court had defended its unusually probing scrutiny of otherwise contentneutral abortion-clinic injunctions on the basis that injunctions, unlike ordinances, are targeted at specific speakers. 29
But it is more plausible to see the problem with a floating buffer as
the one Justice Scalia identified in his dissent in Schenck:30 namely, that
the person in the bubble should not be given, in effect, a content-based
veto power to say "you annoy me, you offend me, go away." Delegation of
veto power to audiences in the public forum has generally been treated as
presumptively content-based, and the government has been generally forbidden from preempting speech likely to annoy or offend listeners in the

24. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757 (upholding a 36-foot fixed buffer zone); Schenck, 117 S.Ct. at
868 (upholding a 15-foot fixed buffer zone).
25. 117 S.Ct. 855.
26. See id. at 867-68.
27. See id.
28. 120 F.3d at 165 (invalidating a Phoenix ordinance requiring demonstrators within 100
feet of a health clinic to withdraw at least eight feet from any person who communicates a request
that they do so).
29. See Schenck, 117 S.Ct. at 864. For an analysis supporting the Ninth Circuit's ultimate
result in Sabelko, see James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination,29 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 471,521-542 (1996).
30. See Schenck, 117 S.Ct. at 871 (Scalia J., dissenting).
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public square.3 1 Thus, Schenck and Sabelko may have reached the right
result on floating buffers but for the wrong reason.
The moral of the story here, as with T-shirt sales, seems to be that flat
bans will withstand First Amendment scrutiny more readily than measures
that afford official or listener discretion to pick and choose the speech that
is to be permitted--even if the latter would permit more speech than the
flat ban. Does this mean that governing interpretation of the First
Amendment ironically gives cities an incentive to ban more speech? To
restrict distribution more than they would otherwise in order to avoid discrimination? The answer is partly, frankly yes. For a number of reasons,
the Court has, indeed, long regarded content discrimination as a greater sin
under the First Amendment than regulation merely inhibiting the distribution of speech.32 Better that there be no speech in a problematic location
than police officers or listeners drawing lines at their excessively subjective discretion.
But the Court has also suggested that there are outer limits to what
cities can do with flat bans and that those outer limits are adequate to ensure that minimal distributive concerns will be met. Specifically, flat bans
on speech, or on conduct closely associated with speech, are permissible
only if not excessively broad. T-shirt peddlers in Honolulu could sell on
sidewalks outside Waikiki, and those evicted from the Capital Mall could
sell on adjacent D.C. sidewalks. The peddling regulations there operated
as place limitations channeling speech elsewhere within a jurisdiction
rather than as total medium bans throughout a jurisdiction. Similarly, the
fixed buffer zones upheld in the abortion clinic cases were at most 36 feet
wide. By contrast, consider Bery v. City of New York, 33 in which the Second Circuit struck down New York's scheme for licensing peddlers, as applied to peddlers of public art, holding that the licensing ordinance was so
restrictive (800 licenses for a city of 8 million) that it actually operated as a
de facto citywide total ban on the selling of public art on the streets of New
York.M
In sum, the current state of First Amendment law suggests five basic
principles that might guide municipal regulation of speech. First, what
matters when you try to regulate speech is what you aim at, not what you
happen to hit. If you aim at public order, safety, aesthetics, economic infrastructure, or other content-neutral goals and do so in a way that is not
31. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 (1971).
32. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46 (1987).
33. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2408 (1997).
34. See id. at 697-98.
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subject-matter specific, not speaker-specific, and not idea-specific, then it
does not matter if what you happen to hit is speech. To take a simple example, putting bumper stickers on the back of a van does not entitle one to
park in a no-parking zone in order to get one's message to the lunchtime
crowd on the sidewalks downtown at high noon. Cities need not be intimidated by decisions like Gaudiya into thinking that they have to build
speaker-specific exceptions into their general, content-neutral laws.
Second, for all the reasons discussed earlier, flat bans or other regulations that are comprehensive and discretionless are more likely to be upheld than laws conferring any discretion. This is so even when a city tries
to build discretion into a law in order to allow more speech, as San Francisco did in the permit regulation invalidated in Gaudiya.
Third, while flat bans are better than laws affording excessive discretion, even flat bans must not be too broad. You should regulate only the
areas you really have to and rarely citywide. The irony, of course, is that
the areas of greatest public sensitivity are also often the very areas speakers most wish to reach. On the other hand, the Court has never suggested
that speakers in the public forum are entitled to maximize the effectiveness
of their speech.
Fourth, even under the Supreme Court's relatively deferential time,
place, and manner standard, a good empirical record is important. Don't
just hypothesize that there are public safety or aesthetic justifications for a
regulation of speech, but make as good an empirical demonstration of your
content-neutral interests as you can, either administratively or, if you are
sued, in a trial record. While the intermediate scrutiny applicable to time,
place, and manner regulations is deferential, it is not a rubber stamp.
Fifth, and finally, avoid content-based exceptions, even if they have
the effect of increasing the amount of permissible speech. Of course,
speakers may well gain little from challenging such exceptions, because in
many cases, assuming the law would have been passed without the exceptions, the remedy will be to strike the exceptions rather than extend them to
the challengers or invalidate the underlying content-neutral law. But
courts will sometimes find that the exceptions, like the thirteenth chime of
a clock, belie the city's asserted justifications, and, in that event, hold that
the underlying law may not be applied to the challenger-a price Los Angeles paid when it wrote what amounted to a content-based exception to its
Venice Boardwalk ban.
Thank you and good luck in holding the balance between running
your cities and providing adequate and nondiscriminatory platforms for
public speech.

